Prelude.
This article relies on the comparative method and a realistic approach, based on which peoples and states seek to maximize their interests (security, economic and social development, and so on) in different ways and ways, competing and seeking synergy with each other. Modern China offers its own model for achieving these goals in an evolutionary way, through multidimensional cooperation in which countries have yet to find an organic balance of interests. The study also continues the cycle of work on the study of models of evolution, begun in the article "Political Evolution of the Washington and Beijing Consensus: Models of Globalization» in 2024.
The purpose of the article is to consider in detail whether "The Chinese way" more stable and viable in the context of the crisis of the liberal world order, whether it can be synchronized with other approaches and models.
The modern world system is going through a period of profound transformations. Geopolitical instability is increasing, security risks and economic protectionism are growing, sharp political turns are noticeable in the United States (a return to isolationism) and Europe (Brexit and the rise of right-wing and left-wing populism), taking into account the already accumulated significant internal contradictions of development. At the same time, in order to overcome these crises, certain states often rely on radical methods – conflicts and wars, technological and trade restrictions, attempts to instrumentalize the universal achievements of culture and sports. Such an approach, disrupting the global coherence of mankind, has repeatedly led to global economic crises or even a world war.
Against this background, China demonstrates a qualitatively different trajectory and development goals – evolutionary and pragmatic, as opposed to the often non-systemic, radical and shocking changes in the West. Today, through gradual reforms and a well-thought-out strategy, the PRC is ensuring internal and improving international stability and forming a new architecture of globalization, an alternative to the course of sharp breaks.
I. The Evolutionary Model of China: Pragmatism Instead of Revolutions.
Historical and political foundations of Beijing's approach. China's evolutionary strategy dates back to the late 1970s, when the country embarked on the path of gradual market reforms while maintaining political stability, when the course of "reform and opening-up" (改革开; pinyin: Gǎigé kāifàng) and "socialism with Chinese characteristics" was proclaimed, while avoiding shock therapy.
At the turn of the 1980s, a discussion began in China about the pace of reforms: whether to liberalize prices sharply (as recommended by the Washington Consensus) or move gradually. As a result, the Chinese leadership rejected the option of "shock therapy" – in 1986, the strategy of gradual price changes and partial reforms won for the economy, and the management opted for incremental transformations. This incrementalism has become entrenched as the principle of "crossing the river by groping for rocks" – first experimenting in selected regions and then disseminating successful solutions. This approach allowed China to avoid the sharp decline in output and hyperinflation that Eastern European countries faced in transition to the market, or some Asian countries (such as Japan) when they lost control over dynamic economic models or became too dependent on external ones Markets. Instead of radically changing institutions, China gradually reformed agriculture, opened up to foreign capital, created special economic zones, and then partially privatized state-owned enterprises. The result is unprecedented economic growth of ~8-10% per year for three decades, which has turned the country into the second economy in the world.
The principle of "double circulation".The concept of Dual Circulation (双循环), announced in 2020, has also become a modern development of the evolutionary approach. This strategy involves relying on two complementary contours of the economy – internal (internal circulation), focused on expanding domestic demand and innovation, and external (international circulation), aimed at exports and global connections. In contrast to the previous model, which was heavily dependent on exports, China is now seeking to balance growth with domestic consumption, which should increase resilience to external shocks. In practice, this means stimulating domestic production of high-tech products, import substitution in critical sectors, and developing a national financial infrastructure. In effect, the "double circulation" codifies China's long-standing goal of achieving greater self-sufficiency in resources and technology.
In the context of the trade war unleashed by the new US administration, Beijing has stepped up its policy of reducing dependence on foreign markets, eliminating bottlenecks – be it rare earth metals or semiconductors. The Chinese economy is huge (the domestic market has a ~1.4 billion population) and is able to absorb a significant part of its own products. Therefore, the Dual Circulation strategy is aimed at vertical integration of production domestically, so that key components and technologies are produced at home. At the same time, the second aspect – external circulation – is designed to support global development and cooperation through initiatives like the Belt and Road (more on this later) and strengthening ties with emerging markets, especially if traditional Western markets are limited by sanctions or protectionism. Thus, the evolutionary model of the PRC is constantly adapting: from Deng's reforms to Xi Jinping's strategy, maintaining continuity in the main thing – the rejection of sharp breaks in favor of gradual, managed, positive, proven change for long-term stability.
This is a contrast to the sharp jerks and "shock" reforms of the West. While China has evolutionarily modernized its economy, many Western countries have experienced turbulent and destabilizing "spurts" over the past decade. An example is Brexit, the UK's sudden break with the EU. Its implementation was accompanied by economic uncertainty, falling investment and complicating trade ties. The IMF warned that increased geopolitical risks, including Brexit, could undermine economic activity and derail Europe's fragile recovery. Indeed, Britain's trade with the EU declined after Exit: in 2024, Britain's exports of goods to the EU were still 18% below 2019 levels.
Another example is the policy of the United States. The period 2016–2020 was marked by a sharp change of course: the United States withdrew from many international agreements (the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran Agreement), launched trade wars (against China, the EU) and even questioned the foundations of the global trading system (WTO). In the first two years, the United States imposed duties on hundreds of billions of imports, which, together with retaliatory measures, led to a decline in global trade growth to 1% – the lowest since the 2012 crisis.The IMF noted that it is precisely "higher tariffs and prolonged uncertainty of trade policy that are hurting investment and demand." Socio-political turbulence has also been growing within Western societies, from the Yellow Vest protests in France to the surge in polarization and unrest in the United States (up to the January 2021 events on Capitol Hill). or at least sharp reversals of the exchange rate, which were often accompanied by short-term shocks. The motives and reasons for such actions of the United States are also understandable and, possibly, correspond to the short-term national interests of this state. But strategically, they have increased the uncertainty and instability of international cooperation, exacerbated chronic crises, and weakened the system of international law and relations between states.
China's reaction was diametrically different: Beijing continued to rely on predictability and institutional continuity. Where the West decided to break established ties (for example, the United States' attempts to break global supply chains, "decoupling" with China), Beijing was looking for ways to stabilize them and reconfigure them evolutionarily. Thus, a comparative analysis shows that the Chinese model of reforms – gradual, experimental, long-term oriented – is fundamentally different from "shock therapy" and political breakthroughs in the West. This creates for China the image of an island of stability in the stormy sea of world politics.
II. China and Global Connectivity.
Belt and Road Initiative.The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, is a key tool for China to strengthen global connectivity. This large-scale program of investment in infrastructure and integration of Eurasia, Africa and Latin America is another evolutionary model of globalization, which is being successfully implemented in practice. In the first decade, the BRI has become a truly global network: as of 2023, China has signed a More than 200 BRI cooperation agreements with more than 150 countries and 30 international organizations. Projects cover the construction of railways and roads, ports, pipelines, energy facilities, telecommunications networks, etc. – in the figurative words of Xi Jinping, "cover the land, seas, sky and the Internet", strengthening the flow of goods, capital and technology between the participants. The total investment through the BRI has already exceeded $1 trillion.
Important features of the BRI are:
- voluntariness: the PRC does not force countries to take part in the initiative by any political or military methods;
- Inclusiveness: participation is open to everyone, regardless of political system, level of development, foreign policy orientation or cultural and economic characteristics. Moreover, countries not only participate in the implementation of this model of cooperation, but also continue to jointly develop it;
- Practicality and pragmatism: the participating countries receive concrete pragmatic benefits from the cooperation of the AI of joint development.
In practice, about 75% of the world's population and over 40% of global GDP are involved in the initiative today. China positions itself as a facilitator of development: it provides loans (through the Eximbank, the China Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) for the construction of roads and power plants where Western private capital does not want to invest due to risks companies, consolidates logistics corridors to European and Middle Eastern consumers, creates exports of demand for steel, cement, and equipment from China. But for many countries in the Global South, this initiative has become almost the only source of long-term investment in infrastructure. Therefore, China has earned a reputation as a guarantor of global connectivity: while some Western states were engaged in internal problems or trade protectionism, Beijing was building new "bridges and roads" between the continents – literally and figuratively.
Role in the institutions of the Global South: BRICS, SCO, ASEAN+. In addition to its own initiatives, China actively participates in and acts as a leader in multilateral associations of developing countries. In the BRICS format (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), Beijing is the largest economy and actually the driving force of integration projects. For example, in 2014, at the Chinese initiative, the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) was established with an authorized capital of $100 billion to finance infrastructure.
At the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in 2023, it was China that actively lobbied for the expansion of the membership - it was decided to admit six new members (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Egypt, Argentina, Ethiopia) from 2024. As Chinese President Xi Jinping noted, "the historic enlargement of BRICS demonstrates a determination for unity and cooperation with a wider range of developing countries." Another important track is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where China, together with Russia, forms the core of Eurasian cooperation. Initially, the SCO focused on regional security (the fight against terrorism in Central Asia), but over time it also acquired an economic dimension – from the projects of the China-Central Asia-Middle East transport corridor to settlements in national currencies. Belarus is on the way, which expands the organization's coverage area. ASEAN+ format: China actively cooperates with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, participating in the ASEAN+3 (with Japan and the Republic of Korea) and ASEAN+8 (East Asia Summit) summits. The culmination was the conclusion of the world's largest trade agreement, RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), in 2020. RCEP unites 15 countries of the Asia-Pacific region (ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand) into a free trade area covering approximately 30% of the world's GDP, trade and population. This is the first free trade agreement between China, Japan and Korea at the same time, which is a breakthrough in itself. but also establish general rules in investments, electronic commerce, and intellectual property. Significance for China: Participation in the RCEP strengthens its role as Asia's economic powerhouse, allowing it to facilitate trade with its neighbors and circumvent the isolation of the United States (which withdrew from the alternative TPP agreement). Collectively, through the BRICS, the SCO, the RCEP, and other formats, Beijing is building a parallel architecture of global governance, where emerging economies coordinate policies and maintain open markets with each other, offsetting instability and protectionism from parts of the West.
China's financial and logistics infrastructure: yuan and CIPS. In 2015, the Chinese equivalent of SWIFT, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), was launched for cross-border settlements in yuan. By 2022, CIPS had already connected about 1300 financial institutions around the world (of which ~40% in China and ~60% overseas). Although CIPS is still inferior in scale to the Western system (for comparison, 11 thousand banks are SWIFT members), its importance is growing rapidly, especially against the backdrop of the rapid growth of sanctions tools and restrictions in the world and the risk of countries being disconnected from SWIFT. The volume of payments through CIPS has reached an average of ¥385 billion per day ($46 billion), and more and more banks are connecting "just in case" to have a backup settlement channel outside of US control and the turbulence of the Global West.
The growth and stability of the Chinese economy is also facilitated by the international use of the Chinese yuan. In 2016, the yuan was included in the IMF's Reserve Currency Basket (SDR), and the share of the yuan in the global gold and foreign exchange reserves of central banks, although small, is steadily increasing – from ~1% in 2016 to 2.7% by the end of 2022.For comparison, this is more than the shares of the Canadian or Australian dollars, although it is still far from the euro (~20%) or the US dollar (~58%). However, the Chinese currency is gaining ground primarily in the field of trade settlements. In 2023, a landmark event took place: the yuan overtook the dollar in terms of use in China's cross-border transactions for the first time. (48% vs. 47% of the total volume of transactions). This reflects Beijing's efforts to internationalize the RMB, from entering into currency swap agreements with many countries (worth more than ¥4 trillion) to encouraging trading partners to settle in national currencies. For example, since 2022, China and Russia have sharply increased the share of the yuan in mutual trade (for the Russian Federation, the yuan has become the main foreign currency, occupying up to 40% of the domestic foreign exchange market). The countries of the Persian Gulf are gradually beginning to accept yuan for oil.
Interdependence with the Global South is growing: China has already become the largest trading partner for more than 120-130 countries around the world, including almost all of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to researchers, about 70% of countries trade with China more than with the United States, and for 60 countries, China is a trading partner No1 (twice as much as the United States). The interests of China and developing countries are intertwined, forming a kind of "alliance of interdependence". In a situation where Washington applies sanctions and tariffs, disrupting global chains, China acts as a stable partner, ready to buy raw materials from African and Latin American countries, supply goods and investments in the process of trade exchange and economic cooperation. – infrastructure, financial and trade – which softens the blows from global crises, Western turbulence, and supports the integration of the global South in the new conditions.
III. The United States in the era of the "second Trump":
a course towards economic sovereignism.
Return to America First. In 2025, Donald Trump again took office as President of the United States ("Trump 2.0"). His previous term has already shown the basic principles of the "America First" doctrine: unilateral protectionism and skepticism towards alliances and multilateral agreements, an emphasis on economic nationalism. The administration immediately set a course for dismantling the globalist legacy of the 90s: already in the first months of the new term, the norms and institutions of the post-war order were attacked - from climate and health agreements to international trade rules. Trump's re-election and actions indicate a permanent shift in the US political paradigm. These are no longer just the swings of the pendulum, which will return to its original position in 4 years, but a consequence of a new social demand and the state of the elites in this country.
First of all, the United States is distancing itself from international organizations. Back in 2020, Trump withdrew from UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, and froze funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) amid the pandemic. The second administration resumed this line: as of early 2025, steps were taken to withdraw the United States from the WHO, to re-withdraw from the Paris Agreement, to which the United States returned during President Biden's time, to the U.S. abandonment of the UN Human Rights Council for the second time, to the ban on U.S. funding to the U.N. aid agency for the Gaza Strip, to the review of Washington's support for UNESCO, U.S. contributions to the WTO were suspended, as well as threats to withdraw from the WTO and even from NATO, and even instructed to analyze the wisdom of U.S. membership in all multilateral institutions. In February 2025, a presidential decree appeared on a total revision of America's international obligations – in fact, calling into question dozens of treaties and membership in hundreds of organizations. The WTO is also under attack: in his first term, Trump weakened the Dispute Settlement Body (by blocking the appointment of appellate body judges) and threatened to withdraw from the WTO, calling it "obsolete." Now the White House has bluntly proclaimed a policy of abandoning multilateral trade rules in favor of bilateral deals, which "portends death" of an already weakened WTO At their discretion, ignoring WTO rules. Moreover, resolutions have been submitted to Congress on the complete withdrawal of the United States from the WTO, and although their legal prospects are not obvious, the very fact shows the level of departure from the previous consensus.
Likewise, there are doubts about the need for NATO, the UN, and even the IMF/World Bank, to the point of possibly ousting the headquarters of these institutions from the United States. Overall, Trump's America is demonstrating historical revisionism: for the first time since the 1940s, a superpower is rejecting its own creation, the liberal multilateral order, and reverting to a more isolationist stance, similar to the 1920s and 30s or the Nixon Doctrine period, which arose against a backdrop of deep public discontent with the war in Vietnam, as well as economic difficulties caused by rising defense spending.
A new wave of trade wars and sanctions. In the economic sphere, the policy of Trump-2 resulted in even more aggressive protectionism. For example, the introduction of a "universal tariff of 10%" on almost all imported goods to the United States. But the tightening of Trump's tariff policy did not end there, and following the basic 10% "on top", individual duties were added for imports to the United States of products from a number of countries, including Bangladesh by 37%, Vietnam by 46%. EU countries by 20%, Israel by 17%, India by 26%, Iraq by 39%, Indonesia by 32%, Cambodia by 49%, China by 54%, Laos by 48%, Lesotho by 50%, Malaysia by 24%, Myanmar by 44%, the Republic of Korea by 25%, Thailand by 36%, Taiwan by 32%, Switzerland by 31%, South Africa by 30% and Japan by 24%. In addition, a 25% import duty on all cars was introduced. Taken together, this has increased, according to The Economist magazine, the average tariff on the import of goods into the United States from 2% to 24%. If dozens of countries perceived this as a threat to themselves and stood in line with Trump to negotiate, showing their readiness to make a number of economic concessions to the United States in order to nullify at least some of the White House's tax innovations in relation to themselves, then China saw in this situation an opportunity to demonstrate its own economic strength and resilience by raising tariff "rates". Thus, China's first response was to increase the duty to 34% on imports of all American goods. In response, Trump has aggressively raised the tariff on Chinese products to 125%. The PRC countered this with 84% duties for the United States. In the final third wave of tariff increases that followed, the US raised the counter to 145% and China to 125%, which, if fully implemented, would have meant a virtual cessation of direct trade between the countries.
As a result, Beijing and Washington announced a mutual reduction in duties by 115% from May 12 (up to 30% on Chinese goods in the United States, and up to 10% on American goods in China). This indicates the Trump administration's bluff towards the PRC, which in the form of tariffs by 145% could not finally establish itself under the influence of the American stock market, criticism of Trump's duties by top officials from his entourage (for example, Elon Musk), and in general, the remaining close industrial interconnection between the Chinese and American economies, which the parties can painlessly break, if at all, then only in the long term. This inspires optimism that during this period in the coming years, the argument of US-Chinese economic cooperation will act as a sufficient deterrent for both superpowers from direct clashes, which, if viable, threaten a crisis for the development of mankind.
But for all of this, a situational tariff settlement between China and the United States would not have been possible without Beijing's bold symmetrical responses to the US tariff increase, which, given that the increased American duties for other countries from above to 10% were never completely canceled, although their implementation was suspended for 90 days, creates a precedent for China to respond to the American tariff policy for other countries. which, including having enlisted their probable support in this from China, they can use to demonstrate the inconsistency of American "tariff hegemony" not only against China, but also against a number of less powerful countries. This will create even worse conditions for the prospects for political American as if absolute, as if relative hegemony, since geopolitics is largely a derivative of geo-economics and the tools of influence manifested by it.
Nevertheless, Trump and his protectionist ideas still have many supporters within the American elites, some of whom supported him in the 2024 elections, realizing the inevitability of strengthening his tariff practices, which were clearly used during his first presidential term. With this elitist support, the current trade war may not be the last. The duration of the pause in the tariff escalation taken by the United States will actually be determined by many mutual factors, but first of all, the readiness of American business to submit to the will of the new administration and the response actions of the PRC. After all, the events of recent decades clearly demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the strategies of various kinds of restrictions and sanctions in the modern world.
It is clear that the use of new tariff limits and barriers by the United States is designed to increase the competitiveness of American companies within one of the richest American markets in the world, the scaling of revenues from which and the movement towards its monopolization in favor of US plants/factories can radically increase their profits and provide a new resource both for the growth of the development of these industries and increase tax revenues to the American budget from the growth of capitalization of American enterprises. which opens a window for large-scale industrial reinvestment. Also, the tariffs are designed to return many industries inside the United States in order to expand the field for its own geopolitical maneuver through the growth of the economic sovereignty of the United States within the framework of maintaining and increasing its external subjectivity, in which the fewer chains of dependence on other countries there are, the cruder their interests in favor of the United States and their influence can be trampled upon, regardless of anything other than the latter.
At the same time, trying to fight trade deficits or deindustrialization with tariffs is like trying to treat the symptoms of the disease, but not the disease itself. Which only worsens the overall health of the whole body. The initiators of tariff restrictions should perhaps think about the causes of the disease - the departure of production and epicenters of business development to other countries and regions - and deal with these causes - improve the business climate - within their state and economic systems, seeking cooperation with other participants in the international economy.
But to some extent, the tariff phenomenon itself shows the inability of the United States to strategically and long-term maintain free economic competition with China and other countries, revealing the weaknesses of the American economy in comparison with the Chinese economy, which is based on much lower production costs and labor efficiency than in the United States. In such a situation, an attempt to maintain one's global primacy or a contender for primacy by administrative tools not only contradicts the previously stated principles and goals, but is also doomed to failure, since it contradicts the objective laws of economic development in the modern multifaceted world.
China as a counterbalance to US isolationism. At a time when Washington is moving away from the role of the leader of globalization, China is acting as a kind of counterbalance, filling the vacuum. First, Beijing continues to declare its commitment to multilateralism and open trade. At international venues, Chinese representatives criticize protectionism and emphasize the need for cooperation. For example, Xi Jinping positioned China as a defender of globalization at the Davos Forum back in 2017. For example, after the United States reduced funding for World Bank projects, China announced at the 2025 BRICS summit an increase in NDB capital and an expansion of lending in national currencies, thereby partially compensating for the lack of official assistance to developing countries. Stable supply chains: American protectionism caused disruptions (recall the shortage of goods in 2018-2019 due to tariffs). China proved to be a reliable supplier: despite political tensions, Chinese exports continued to grow and meet the needs of the markets. Even the United States, while imposing tariffs, could not reduce imports from China in absolute terms – American companies simply passed on the increase in duties to prices for consumers. redirect flows, for example, more to emerging markets if access to the U.S. narrows. China's "soft power" also played a role: during the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing launched "mask diplomacy", supplying protective equipment to dozens of countries, while the United States itself initially faced a crisis from Western suppliers, and offering their technologies to others. Thus, for every attempt by the United States to isolate itself or to isolate someone, China responds with initiatives that are opposite in vector: integrate, connect, replenish from open markets and a world without sanctions, so the PRC positions itself as the guardian of stability, contrasting its evolutionary approach with the "revolutionary" rejection of global leadership by the United States.
IV. The World's Reaction: Redistribution of Roles in Post-Western Globalization.
Multipolarity instead of Western hegemony. In response to the above-mentioned shifts, a multipolar system of international relations is being accelerated . Multipolarity is understood as an order where several centers of power (the United States, China, the EU, Russia, India, Brazil, etc.) interact, none of which single-handedly dominates. global leadership, this concept is getting a new meaning.
Moreover, now it is the PRC that acts as the main custodian of the UN and other elements of the "rules-based world" system. But China interprets it differently than the "Global West" and Ukraine, giving it a priority focus not only and not so much to formal principles, but to the issues of global stability and security, the impossibility of ensuring the security of one state to the detriment of the security of another state (the term "indivisibility of security") - by this meaning the unacceptability of the unhindered expansion of military-political blocs.
Under the factor of indivisibility of security and tying their dissatisfaction with the expansion of NATO and the existence of the Asia-Pacific analogue of NATO in the form of AUKUS, believing that NATO and AUKUS harm Russian and Chinese security, respectively, building on the opposition and deterrence of the Russian Federation and the PRC in their semantic goal-setting.
China is not interested in the destruction of the bureaucratic architecture of international law and international stability established after World War II in the form of the UN, UNESCO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the UN International Criminal Court, and the Hague Tribunal. Since the current legal framework of the current world order is reasonably considered by Beijing to be sufficient for the qualitative conversion of its economic power into a fixed geopolitical influence and status one of the officially recognized poles of geopolitics. This is facilitated by the initial creation of the UN framework in 1945 as a system of a bipolar world. China's commitment to preserving the UN system is also confirmed by its public rhetoric, such as paragraph 1 of the PRC Peace Plan (or rather, a set of PRC initiatives) of February 2023 for a peaceful settlement in Ukraine, which consists of the following: "Respect for the sovereignty, guarantees of independence and territorial integrity of all countries, the primacy of international law without "double standards" - which is fully consonant with the UN Charter.
Regional blocs are becoming stronger: in addition to the already mentioned BRICS and the SCO, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and others are becoming more active. In this way, "globalization from below" or "horizontally" is being built, where developing countries establish ties with each other directly (South-South). The redistribution of roles is manifested, for example, in the fact that rich countries are losing their monopoly on international norms: alternative principles are being developed (in BRICS, respect for sovereignty and non-interference; in Chinese initiatives, "the common destiny of mankind" and "mutually beneficial cooperation" instead of liberal values). Alternatives are being legitimized – the very fact of China's successful development without the Western model inspires other states to look for their own way. If earlier the Washington Consensus was considered a universal formula, now the "Beijing Consensus" – based on the state and gradual reforms – is perceived as a quite viable development option. Of course, it is too early to talk about a full-fledged consensus – many note the vagueness of this concept.
Pragmatic rapprochement between the EU and China. The European Union, a traditional partner and ally of the United States, has found itself in a difficult position between the two economic giants. On the one hand, Brussels shares values and security with America, on the other hand, it is economically very dependent on China (for Germany, for example, China is the main export market for cars, and for France it is an important source of investment). French President Emmanuel Macron became the mouthpiece for the idea of "strategic autonomy for Europe", that is, the ability to act independently of the United States. After his visit to Beijing in 2023, Macron bluntly stated: "It is dangerous for Europe to be a vassal in someone else's conflict between the United States and China.", urging not to automatically follow American policy towards Taiwan. He stressed that it would be a trap for the EU to get involved in a confrontation that does not belong to Europe, instead of strengthening its own autonomy. These words caused a storm of criticism in the United States and Eastern Europe, but reflected a certain mood in large EU countries: without destroying the alliance with America, diversify supports. In practice, this is manifested in the fact that the EU is trying to balance. On the one hand, Europe supports the United States on human rights issues (including criticizing China) and security (NATO, containing Russia). On the other hand, it does not want to sever economic ties with China. that despite talk of "reducing dependence", EU-China trade in 2022-2024 continued to break records, exceeding €850 billion. France signed multibillion-dollar agreements with China (Airbus, nuclear energy) just during Macron's visit. Although Italy is going to withdraw from the BRI memorandum under pressure from its allies, it is looking for new formats of interaction. Even the UK is interested in Chinese investment after Brexit (for example, the Sizewell nuclear power plant project attracted Chinese capital).
Thus, pragmatism prevails: the Europeans do not want to take 100% of the side of the United States in the economic Cold War, nor completely fall under the influence of Beijing. But the very rhetoric about strategic autonomy shows that the behavior of the United States (especially under Trump) has undermined Europe's unconditional trust . As a result, the EU increases its interaction with China where it meets its interests – for example, within the framework of the implementation of the Paris climate agreement, China and In other words, the European Union is adapting to multipolarity, striving to be an independent "third pole", as Macron noted, which objectively brings it closer to China in a number of areas, although not without reservations.
The Global South: a bet on development, not ideology. Countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America – the so-called Global South – have generally responded positively to China's evolutionary strategy. They are attracted to a model focused on economic stability and growth, without the imposition of political conditions. Many countries in the South have been disappointed in Western approaches: IMF and World Bank programs have often called for austerity (which has led to social upheaval), and aid has been tied to political requirements (democratization, human rights). China, on the other hand, offers cooperation "without preconditions" – loans and investments in exchange for commercial agreements and loyalty, but does not interfere in domestic politics. In addition, countries that remain neutral in conflicts (for example, most African and Latin American states have not joined the sanctions against Russia) are interested in avoiding the division of the world into blocs , where you can maneuver between the centers of power and get benefits from everyone. China often plays the role of a coordination center in this format.
For example, at the China-Africa Forum (FOCAC), Beijing brings together dozens of leaders of African countries, promising infrastructure financing, debt relief, and the exchange of development experience. Similar summits are held with Arab countries and Latin America. The rhetoric of the leaders of the South is increasingly leaning towards support for Chinese initiatives. Brazilian President Lula da Silva in 2023 He openly supported the idea of creating a new currency for BRICS settlements in order to reduce dependence on the United States. This is in line with China's efforts to internationalize the yuan. African leaders, such as South African President S. Ramaphosa, welcome the expansion of BRICS as a step towards a "fairer, more inclusive and prosperous world". Such statements show that the discourse on multipolarity and justice is shared by many outside the West. For them, China is an important ally, because it embodies a challenge to the established hierarchy of international relations, where developing countries have long been on the periphery. Of course, not everything is perfect: some recipients of Chinese loans have faced the problem of debt burden, there have been cases of corruption, and environmental risks of BRI projects. The Global South is largely unenthusiastic about the ideological battles of the West (democracy versus authoritarianism), preferring the pragmatism of development. As one African commentator aptly put it, "we are more concerned with building roads and power plants than with abstract values." This means that in the new architecture of the world order, the countries of the South see China not as a threat, but rather as an example and a chance to accelerate their own development in a more equal system. This is the main shift: the world periphery is no longer automatically following the West, it has an alternative reference point and partner – an evolutionary and stable one China.
V. Conclusion: Global Evolution and Stability as China's Strategy.
Against the backdrop of turbulence emanating from the "global West," China is increasingly positioning itself as an anchor of stability in the world system. The evolutionary strategy chosen by Beijing – gradual reforms within and the gradual formation of a parallel global infrastructure outside – is bearing fruit. The PRC does not impose its development model, but offers other countries, especially the developing world, an alternative based on sovereignty, mutual benefit, predictability and the "success story" of the PRC. In the 21st century, when the liberal world order is in crisis, the Chinese approach is attractive due to its pragmatism. Yes, it is criticized for "authoritarianism" and "realpolitik", but it cannot be denied that for many countries the evolutionary path of the PRC looks more viable than the Western "revolutions" of recent years.
The long-term sustainability of China's path will, of course, depend on internal and external factors: whether China will be able to resolve the accumulated imbalances (debts, real estate, demographics) without shocks; whether it will be possible to avoid direct confrontation with the United States; whether the global economy will continue to strive for integration rather than disintegration into blocs. But a new core is already visible: the reorganization of the world system. Instead of a single globalized world under the leadership of one country or a group of countries, a network of regional subsystems is emerging, interconnected largely thanks to Chinese initiatives. In these conditions, China plays the role of one of the architects of a new system – a system where stability is achieved not through the hegemony of one power and jumps between crises, but through balance and evolution. Perhaps this approach is in keeping with the spirit of the twenty-first century: a century not of "radical change" but of progressive development based on respect for the diversity of paths. The Chinese evolutionary strategy, as opposed to Western turbulence, is already becoming a factor determining the directions of world development. And if it remains sustainable, the global architecture of the future will inevitably be built on the basis of China's experience of stability – an experience that proves that evolution can be more effective than revolutions in achieving prosperity and order in the international system.
The modern world is going through an era of change and instability, when established institutions are being seriously tested. Against this background, China's strategy seems to be a living tree: its roots go deep into the internal soil of hard work and achievements, reforms and modernization, and its branches stretch into the world community through large-scale international initiatives. A mighty tree with strong roots and a vast crown reflects the organic, holistic nature of the Chinese path of development, which allows China to remain stable against the backdrop of the instability of the Western world and organically integrate into global transformation.
The roots of this "tree" are buried deep in the Chinese soil: intensive modernization of the economy, the accumulation of technological capacities and the strengthening of the socio-economic foundation. The recently launched "double circulation" strategy emphasizes that the domestic economy serves as a pillar of growth, and domestic and international markets complement each other. The build-up of high technology, the rise in living standards, and the expansion of the middle class all feed the roots, forming a solid foundation that feeds the tree of stability. A reliable root system allows China to sprout new projects without sharp failures, like annual rings that fix each increment and maintain the continuity of development.
Since 2013, China has been developing a large-scale Belt and Road Initiative, building land and sea corridors through Asia, Africa and Europe. The Belt and Road covers over 63% of the world's population and a total GDP of about $21 trillion. At the same time, China, the world's second largest economy in terms of GDP, has serious resources to implement such ambitious projects. At the same time, in the multilateral plane, Beijing occupies a leading role in the BRICS association: "China, with its large share of GDP in the group, plays a dominant role in the association." The new members and partners of the BRICS are expanding the "branch" of this structure, linking China with the growing economic power of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. In this way, China's "branches" serve as bridges to the world – they gravitate towards mutually beneficial cooperation and integration, providing the "tree" of growth with fresh nutrients from the outside.
Yes, a tree grows slowly, but organically and comprehensively, it is resistant to storms and climate change, it cooperates with the outside world, takes resources and gives them away, and creates its own ecosystem around itself for other plants and animals; it lives long and stable. In the same way, China's current strategy is not a piecemeal action, but a holistic, evolutionary process. where the inner core and external connections harmoniously complement each other. Just as annual rings record each stage of a tree's growth, the accumulated experience and systematic reforms create the basis for the next rounds of development. China's oak tree grows slowly but surely rather than subject to the storms of global change: its growth is driven by a deep synthesis of development goals, not by leaps and bounds. In this organic model, China's path sounds like a natural rhythm of growth – the Chinese strategy is gradually integrated into the overall architecture of world transformation, showing that change can go step by step, coherently strengthening the branches and roots of the "tree" of national development.
Ruslan Bortnik,
Director of the Ukrainian Institute of Politics,
Ukraine, Kyiv, 2025