SITUATION IN UKRAINE: 1 – 7, 2024.

The story of the confrontation between President V. Zelensky and the team of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhny, continues. In particular, the President continues to pressure the commander-in-chief to force him to resign. At the same time, the President has yet to decide to publish a decree on the dismissal of V. Zaluzhny because this will strengthen the commander-in-chief politically and will place additional responsibility on V. Zelensky for the further course of events at the front And V. Zaluzhny insists that he may only be fired and will not resign voluntarily. In general, the situation regarding the dismissal/non-dismissal of V. Zaluzhny remains fragile; the balance can be upset either by some event in domestic politics or by a new crisis at the front, which will make it possible to blame V. Zaluzhny for a military failure (for example, in the battles around Avdeevka), or the intervention of Western partners who can resolve this crisis in relations between the OP and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But while the US White House is distancing itself from resolving this issue, since the possible negative consequences of the replacement of V. Zaluzhny may also affect the US election campaign and will serve as a reason for additional criticism from the Republicans regarding the ineffectiveness of the foreign policy of US President D. Biden.

Thus, President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky, in an interview with the Italian television channel Rai News 24, confirmed that he was considering the possibility of dismissing Valery Zaluzhny and also hinted that he was considering a reboot of the senior military leadership as a whole. Thus, potentially the resignation of V. Zaluzhny will entail a large-scale reformatting of the army, in connection with which several dozen more officers in the general staff may lose their positions - these are people primarily focused on V. Zaluzhny, as well as on ex-President P Poroshenko and other oppositionists.

On February 2, The Washington Post reported that the leadership of Ukraine informed US President Joe Biden about the decision to dismiss the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhny (it appeared after the publication of an article by V. Zaluzhny in CNN, where he directly accused the political leadership of Ukraine for its inability to ensure the process of mobilization into the army). According to the newspaper, the White House does not express either support or criticism regarding this decision, recognizing it as the sovereign right of the President of Ukraine. At the same time, the publication stated that the departure of Zaluzhny, one of the most famous people in Ukraine, could negatively affect the troops' morale and shake the confidence of Western donors that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able to repel the advancing Russian troops. National Security Advisor to US President Jake Sullivan said in an interview with CBS that the United States will not interfere in the personnel decisions of Ukrainian authorities regarding the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, the United States confirmed at the official level that the Ukrainian authorities consulted with Washington about the resignation of V. Zaluzhny, and the leadership of the White House did not dare to support the commander-in-chief publicly; it is evident that the United States considers the intensification of confrontation between V. Zaluzhny and V. Zelensky to be a significant risk for stability within Ukraine. The American side does not want to take any responsibility in the matter of dismissal/non-dismissal of V. Zaluzhny, ultimately shifting responsibility for the possible negative consequences of such a decision to representatives of the Ukrainian authorities.

Amid rumors about the dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valery Zaluzhny, and delays in the release of American aid, Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland visited Ukraine.

The visit of V. Nuland, as well as other high-ranking representatives (a delegation of Inspectors General of the Ministry of Defense Robert Storch, State Department Diana Shaw, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Paul Martin), is primarily designed to maintain their influence on political and economic processes in a situation where the Administration of US President D. Biden cannot provide significant military and financial assistance to Ukraine.

A pause in the provision of assistance from the United States, together with a decrease in political influence (due to the aggravation of the confrontation between the Democratic and Republican parties), provides Ukrainian political players with specific opportunities to pursue an active domestic policy, in particular, to put pressure on influence groups affiliated with the United States. There is pressure on Tomas Fiala, the figures associated with him, and several US-oriented media representatives.

It is possible that the arrival of V. Nuland somewhat "pulled down" the authorities in this regard. Thus, the President fired the head of the Department for the Protection of National Statehood of the SBU, Roman Semenchenko, whose resignation is associated with a scandal involving the surveillance of employees of the Bigus.info project.

But in the same trend, pressure on ex-president P. Poroshenko is increasing. The State Bureau of Investigation of Ukraine has completed a pre-trial investigation under the so-called "coal business." P. Poroshenko is suspected of committing high treason and assisting a terrorist organization. The SBI must send an indictment against Petro Poroshenko to the court, after which his status changes and he becomes an accused.

Given the dynamics of the war and the quantitative advantage of the Russian Federation at the front in Ukraine, there is a need to tighten mobilization in one form or another. On February 7, Parliament adopted the law on mobilization in the first reading (Draft Law No. 10449 "On amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine regarding certain issues of military service, mobilization, and military registration"), and 243 MPs supported it. Notably, the vote would have failed without the support of 2 entities from the former OPFL - Platform for Life and Vidnovlennya of Ukraine.

Main provisions of the law: mobilization age is reduced from 27 to 25 years; electronic subpoenas are introduced, which are considered served from the moment they appear in the electronic account; it must be created all persons liable for military service within 60 days from the date of entry into force of the law; for failure to appear on the summons, all accounts of the evader are blocked, a ban is placed on using a car and traveling abroad; citizens aged 18 to 60 years must have a military registration document with them and present it at the request of a representative of the TCC, a police officer or the State Border Guard Service; demobilization of the military is possible after 36 months of continuous service; conscription will be replaced by basic military training; Citizens with disabilities of all groups are not subject to mobilization. Those who received disability after February 24, 2022, must re-pass the commission. Those who receive a second higher education and postgraduate students studying under a contract lose a deferment from mobilization.

The mobilization law has been criticized by The Main Scientific and Expert Directorate, the Anti-Corruption Committee of the Parliament, Ombudsman D. Lubinets, the European Business Association, etc. They believe the bill contains provisions that create corruption risks, contradict the Constitution of Ukraine, and may have negative economic consequences.

The fact that the law on mobilization was adopted as a basis is only the first act of this "play." It is worth noting that no one in government circles wants to take direct responsibility for extremely unpopular mobilization measures to society.

In addition, the issue of mobilization is one of the main reasons for the aggravation of disagreements between the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny. Therefore, this law had to be adopted even before the possible resignation of V. Zaluzhny to share responsibility with him. It was also necessary to partially relieve tension between politicians and the military against the backdrop of mobilization processes.

But the real "battle" for this law is yet to come when thousands of amendments will begin to be made to it, and discussions will unfold about finances, human rights, and everything else. In the meantime, the law on mobilization was adopted "under V. Zaluzhny" to achieve information and political goals.

But in its current form, this bill is unlikely to be adopted under severe external pressure. In the future, the law on mobilization will be seriously modified and "cut." There will be many amendments to the law (they can be introduced until February 21), and their consideration may take weeks. Then, the law will be sent for signature to the Head of the Verkhovna Rada (in parallel, MPs may try to block the signing with alternative resolutions), then for signature by the President. The law will likely be passed in the last week of February, signed in early March, and come into force a month later, that is, in April.

Considering that there is still no certainty on the volume of assistance from partner partners, finding resources to replenish the army with hundreds of thousands of new soldiers is extremely difficult. Additional mobilization of 400-500 thousand people (which the military insists on) will cost the Ukrainian budget about 720 billion UAH. This was announced by the head of the budget committee, Roksolana Pidlasa. Only for training, payments, and clothing for the mobilized, 322 billion UAH are needed, and another 400 are required to purchase and modernize military equipment. This amounts to 22.5% of all state budget expenditures or 41% of defense expenditures. To find money, various options are being discussed - from the return of a progressive personal income tax rate (an increase in income tax depending on the amount of income) and a luxury tax to the additional withdrawal of resources from local budgets.

The allocation of aid to Ukraine was stalled in the US Congress due to intra-party confrontation between Republicans and Democrats.

Thus, the US Senate released a draft agreement on $118 billion to finance border policy ($5 billion) and assistance to Ukraine ($61 billion) and Israel ($14 billion). President Joe Biden endorsed the border agreement and called on Congress to pass it and send it to him for his signature. But House Speaker Mike Johnson said the chamber would not consider a bipartisan deal and called for a separate vote on aid to Israel on Tuesday. President Joe Biden threatened to veto the bill because it did not include funds for Ukraine, prompting a majority of Democrats to oppose the legislation, and the vote failed. M. Johnson's bill required a two-thirds majority, which also meant attracting some of the Democratic votes. Congress could split aid issues to Ukraine, Israel, and border security in the future. But overall, it is still unlikely that Republicans and Democrats will be able to agree on this issue.

Former President (and the most likely candidate from the Republican Party in future elections) D. Trump calls on Republicans to abandon any agreement with the Democrats and postpone the issue of accepting assistance to Ukraine until his possible victory in the presidential election.

This is primarily because the Administration of D. Biden is attempting to remove D. Trump from the elections. In addition, a positive solution to the issue will add political points to D. Biden.

Given the influence of Donald Trump's supporters in the House of Representatives and the pressure that Trump is putting on Speaker of the House of Representatives, M. Johnson, it is still unlikely that the parties will be able to reach a compromise.

Against this background, the problem of financing Ukraine has shifted mainly to European countries. The head of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell (he arrived on an official visit to Kyiv), said that Ukraine will receive at least 21 billion euros in aid from the EU in 2024. The EU has already provided Ukraine with 28 billion euros in assistance.

On February 1, 27 EU countries agreed to provide Ukraine with 50 billion euros

of financial assistance.

In general, the process of assisting Ukraine from the EU in the amount of 50 billion euros (the program is designed for four years) is 17 billion euros in grants and 33 billion euros in loans. At the same time, grants of 17 billion euros, within the framework of the new "Reserve for Ukraine" instrument, are planned to be received from income from frozen Russian assets. In particular, today, the European Council supports using revenue from frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine. But to launch this process, it is necessary to adopt additional legislative acts in Europe; moreover, the Russian Federation will challenge such a decision in the courts. Therefore, Ukraine receiving these grants (worth $17 billion) may take significant time.

Regarding the provision of loans for $33 billion, the EU put forward several demands to Ukraine, For the implementation of which payments will be received quarterly. So the Government must develop a specific reform plan, including support for effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, law supremacy, and guarantees of respect for human rights, including minorities. Ukraine must also ensure no corruption or conflict of interest in using these funds.

Each of these demands can turn into an instrument of constant pressure and blackmail against Ukraine, including about minority rights, the fight against corruption, or the degradation of democracy in Ukraine.

The EU will be able to approve and stop payments. If necessary, the European Council will propose revising the program after two years. But this year in the European Union, elections and the composition of the European Commission and the European Parliament may change significantly, and the next convocation may have a completely different attitude regarding assistance to Ukraine.

For Ukraine today, the issue of financing and arms supplies is critical. As a result of the delay in Western aid, Ukraine is already facing a shortage of weapons and money to continue the war.

Let us also remind you that to cover Ukraine's budget deficit, according to the Ministry of Finance, up to $37.3 billion in foreign aid is needed this year. That is, Ukraine will need about $16 billion more. Additional funds will be sought in negotiations with the governments of Canada, Norway, Japan, and South Korea. The World Bank can add a little more.

The United States and other partner countries finance significant Ukrainian government spending. The Government cut part of its budget expenditures in January due to a lack of financial assistance from international partners.

So, in January 2024. the level of Western assistance was the lowest since the beginning of the war - only $390 million compared to December 2023. – about 5 billion dollars

Revenues of Ukraine's Budget for January 2024. amounted to - 154.9 billion UAH for comparison, in December 2023, they amounted to about 350 billion UAH. The total budget deficit for 2024 is 1.57 trillion. UAH The Government does not rule out the resumption of hryvnia emission, leading to increased inflation and devaluation of the national currency.

Payments on Ukraine's external debt 2023 amounted to UAH 122.4 billion, or $3.3 billion. Ukraine's total external public debt in 2023 increased by 42.3% ($30.23 billion) – to $101.70 billion. While the total domestic - by 13.3% (UAH 194.6 billion) - to UAH 1.656 trillion.

According to NBU data, in January 2024, Ukraine paid $441.6 million for the repayment and servicing of public debt. As of February 1, 2024, Ukraine's international reserves decreased by 4.9%, amounting to $38.525 billion.

The Parliament of Ukraine approved presidential decrees on the continuation of martial law and general mobilization from February 14, 2023, for 90 days until May 13, 2024. This is the tenth parliamentary vote on martial law since the start of the war.

At the front, the main battles continue in the direction of Donetsk. The situation near Avdiivka continues to become more complicated for Ukrainian troops. Thus, the RF Armed Forces advanced to the city of Avdeevka from the northern side (from the village of Veseloye) and on the southern approaches - in the area of the village of Opytne. Suppose the Russians can advance further in these directions. In that case, the Ukrainian troops in the rest of Avdiivka will be under the threat of complete encirclement, and the question of the need to withdraw them from the city will arise. The tense situation is also in the Kupyansk direction. Here, the battles for the settlement continue. Tabayivka and east of the village of Ternove, where the RF Armed Forces advanced somewhat.

Ukraine will receive from the US GLSDB aerial bombs with a maximum destruction range of up to 150 kilometers. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland announced this. These munitions, in particular, can be launched from HIMARS. They are an alternative to long-range ATACMS missiles, which the Americans transferred to Ukraine last year on a limited scale. How much has been transferred to GLSDB has yet to be discovered. The new missiles will be able to hit targets throughout the occupied territory of Ukraine, the northwest of Crimea, and the border territories of the Russian Federation.

Symmetrically, the Russian Federation stated that it would strive to create a demilitarized zone in Ukraine. Yesterday, at a meeting with trusted officials, Russian President V. Putin said that he “will push back the demilitarized zone” in Ukraine, which would ensure the security of Russian cities. The demilitarized zone must be at a distance that guarantees there is no “threat from a long-range weapon” used by Ukraine.

Earlier, V. Putin stated that the Russian Federation wants to create such a zone along the border with Ukraine. In reality, we can talk about 30-60 km deep into the territory of Ukraine. Large regional centers such as Kharkiv, Sumy, and even Chernihiv (if we consider the distance from the Belarusian border) fall into the "buffer zone."

Against a possible reduction in assistance from Western partners and increased military spending, the Ukrainian authorities are trying to use various tools to replenish the budget, including increasing the financial burden on business and the population. So in Kyiv, they can raise the water tariff by 34% starting in April and by another 15% beginning in July. Kyivvodokanal submitted such proposals to NEURC. It is proposed to increase the fee for water supply to 17.57 UAH per 1 cubic meter from April 1 and for sewerage - to 16.41 UAH. And from July 1 - up to 21.42 UAH and 17.66 UAH, respectively. Kyivvodokanal says that the costs of the service are growing, and its implementation is decreasing. It was previously reported that electricity tariffs for households could double.

Combat map.

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Internal situation in the country.

The situation around dismissing the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny.

The story of the confrontation between President V. Zelensky and the team of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhny, continues. In particular, the President continues to pressure the commander-in-chief to force him to resign. At the same time, the President has yet to decide to publish a decree on the dismissal of V. Zaluzhny. This will strengthen the commander-in-chief politically and place additional responsibility on V. Zelensky for further events at the front. And V. Zaluzhny insists that he may only be fired and will not resign voluntarily. In general, the situation regarding the dismissal/non-dismissal of V. Zaluzhny remains fragile; the balance can be upset either by some event in domestic politics or by a new crisis at the front, which will make it possible to blame V. Zaluzhny for a military failure (for example, in the battles around Avdeevka), or the intervention of Western partners who can resolve this crisis in relations between the OP and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But for now, the US White House is distancing itself from resolving this issue since the possible negative consequences of the replacement of V. Zaluzhny may also affect the US election campaign and serve as a reason for additional criticism from the Republicans regarding the ineffectiveness of the foreign policy of US President D. Biden.

Thus, President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky, in an interview with the Italian television channel Rai News 24, confirmed that he was considering the possibility of dismissing Valery Zaluzhny and also hinted that he was considering a reboot of the senior military leadership as a whole. Thus, potentially the resignation of V. Zaluzhny will entail a large-scale reformatting of the army, in connection with which several dozen more officers in the general staff may lose their positions - these are people primarily focused on V. Zaluzhny, as well as on ex-President P Poroshenko and other oppositionists.

On February 2, The Washington Post reported that the leadership of Ukraine informed US President Joe Biden about the decision to dismiss the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhny (it appeared after the publication of an article by V. Zaluzhny in CNN, where he directly accused the political leadership of Ukraine for its inability to ensure the process of mobilization into the army). According to the newspaper, the White House does not express either support or criticism regarding this decision, recognizing it as the sovereign right of the President of Ukraine. At the same time, the publication stated that the departure of Zaluzhny, one of the most famous people in Ukraine, could negatively affect the troops' morale and shake the confidence of Western donors that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be able to repel the advancing Russian troops. National Security Advisor to US President Jake Sullivan said in an interview with CBS that the United States will not interfere in the personnel decisions of Ukrainian authorities regarding the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, the United States confirmed at the official level that the Ukrainian authorities consulted with Washington about the resignation of V. Zaluzhny, and the leadership of the White House did not dare to support the commander-in-chief publicly; it is evident that the United States considers the intensification of confrontation between V. Zaluzhny and V. Zelensky to be a significant risk for stability within Ukraine. The American side does not want to take any responsibility in the matter of dismissal/non-dismissal of V. Zaluzhny, ultimately shifting responsibility for the possible negative consequences of such a decision to representatives of the Ukrainian authorities.

 

Problems of mobilization.

The main problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the front is the lack of people (which was outlined by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhny, in his interview with CNN), remains unsolvable so far, which is the main risk for Ukraine in the war. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny proposes to replace people and shells with drones, relying on attack UAVs in the war. However, the Russian Federation is also actively developing this direction. And the fate of the war largely depends on who wins the drone race.

On February 7, Parliament adopted the law on mobilization in the first reading (Draft Law No. 10449 "On amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine regarding certain issues of military service, mobilization, and military registration"), and 243 MPs supported it. The bill was passed without any proposals from the Committee.

Voting by factions: Servant of the People - 178, European Solidarity - 0, Batkivshchyna - 0, Platform for Life and Peace - 17, For the Future - 7, Voice - 3, Trust - 18, Vision of Ukraine - 12, Non-factional - 8."

Notably, the vote would have succeeded with the support of 2 entities from the former OPZZH - Platform for Life and Restoration of Ukraine.

For the second reading, MPs will continue to amend the law until February 21. First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine A. Kornienko said several positions in the bill give rise to discussion.

The mobilization law has been criticized by The Main Scientific and Expert Directorate, the Anti-Corruption Committee of the Parliament, Ombudsman D. Lubinets, the European Business Association, etc. They believe the bill contains provisions that create corruption risks, contradict the Constitution of Ukraine, and may have negative economic consequences.

Main provisions of the law: mobilization age is reduced from 27 to 25 years; electronic subpoenas are introduced, which are considered served from the moment they appear in the electronic account; it must be created all persons liable for military service within 60 days from the date of entry into force of the law; for failure to appear on the summons, all accounts of the evader are blocked, a ban is placed on using a car and traveling abroad; citizens aged 18 to 60 years must have a military registration document with them and present it at the request of a representative of the TCC, a police officer or the State Border Guard Service; demobilization of the military is possible after 36 months of continuous service; conscription will be replaced by basic military training; Citizens with disabilities of all groups are not subject to mobilization. Those who received disability after February 24, 2022, must re-pass the commission. Those who receive a second higher education and postgraduate students on a contract lose a deferment from mobilization.

The fact that the law on mobilization was adopted as a basis is only the first act of this "play ."It is worth noting that no one in government circles wants to take direct responsibility for extremely unpopular mobilization measures to society.

In addition, the issue of mobilization is one of the main reasons for the aggravation of disagreements between the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine V. Zaluzhny. Therefore, this law had to be adopted even before the possible resignation of V. Zaluzhny to share responsibility with him. It was also necessary to partially relieve tension between politicians and the military against the backdrop of mobilization processes.

But the real "battle" for this law is yet to come when thousands of amendments begin, and discussions about finances, human rights, and everything else will unfold. In the meantime, the law on mobilization was adopted "under V. Zaluzhny" to achieve information and political goals.

But in its current form, this bill is unlikely to be adopted under severe external pressure. In the future, the law on mobilization will be seriously modified and "cut." There will be many amendments to the law (they can be introduced until February 21), and their consideration may take weeks. Then, the law will be sent for signature to the Head of the Verkhovna Rada (in parallel, MPs may try to block the signing with alternative resolutions), then for signature by the President. The law will likely be passed in the last week of February, signed in early March, and come into force a month later, that is, in April.

Considering that there is still no certainty on the volume of assistance from partner partners, finding resources to replenish the army with hundreds of thousands of new soldiers is extremely difficult. Additional mobilization of 400-500 thousand people (which the military insists on) will cost the Ukrainian budget about 720 billion UAH. This was announced by the head of the budget committee, Roksolana Pidlasa. Only for training, payments, and clothing for the mobilized, 322 billion UAH are needed, and another 400 are required to purchase and modernize military equipment. This amounts to 22.5% of all state budget expenditures or 41% of defense expenditures. To find money, various options are being discussed - from the return of a progressive personal income tax rate (an increase in income tax depending on the amount of income) and a luxury tax to the additional withdrawal of resources from local budgets.

The situation around Ukraine.

The situation with the financing of Ukraine.

Debates continue in the US Congress regarding the allocation of funding to Ukraine. Thus, the US Senate released a draft agreement on $118 billion to finance border policy ($5 billion) and assistance to Ukraine ($61 billion) and Israel ($14 billion). President Joe Biden endorsed the border agreement and called on Congress to pass it and send it to him for his signature. But House Speaker Mike Johnson said the chamber would not consider a bipartisan deal and called for a separate vote on aid to Israel on Tuesday. President Joe Biden threatened to veto the bill because it did not include funds for Ukraine, prompting a majority of Democrats to oppose the legislation, and the vote failed. M. Johnson's bill required a two-thirds majority, which also meant attracting some of the Democratic votes. Congress could split aid issues to Ukraine, Israel, and border security in the future. But overall, it is still unlikely that Republicans and Democrats will be able to agree on this issue.

Former President (and the most likely candidate from the Republican Party in future elections) D. Trump calls on Republicans to abandon any agreement with the Democrats and postpone the issue of accepting assistance to Ukraine until his possible victory in the presidential election.

This is primarily because the Administration of D. Biden is attempting to remove D. Trump from the elections. In addition, a positive solution to the issue will add political points to D. Biden.

Given the influence of Donald Trump's supporters in the House of Representatives and the pressure that Trump is putting on Speaker of the House of Representatives, M. Johnson, it is still unlikely that the parties will be able to reach a compromise.

Against this background, the problem of financing Ukraine has shifted mainly to European countries. The head of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell (he arrived on an official visit to Kyiv), said that Ukraine will receive at least 21 billion euros in aid from the EU in 2024. The EU has already provided Ukraine with 28 billion euros in assistance.

On February 1, 27 EU countries agreed to provide Ukraine with 50 billion euros of financial assistance.

In general, if we consider the process of assisting Ukraine from the EU in the amount of 50 billion euros (the program is designed for four years), of which 17 billion euros are grants and 33 billion euros are loans. At the same time, grants of 17 billion euros, within the framework of the new "Reserve for Ukraine" instrument, are planned to be received from income from frozen Russian assets. In particular, today, the European Council supports using income from frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine. But to launch this process, it is necessary to adopt additional legislative acts in Europe; moreover, the Russian Federation will challenge such a decision in the courts. Therefore, Ukraine receiving these grants (worth $17 billion) may take significant time.

Regarding the provision of loans for $33 billion, the EU put forward several demands to Ukraine, For the implementation of which payments will be received quarterly. So the Government must develop a specific reform plan, including support for effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, law supremacy, and guarantees of respect for human rights, including minorities. Ukraine must also ensure no corruption or conflict of interest in using these funds.

Each of these demands can turn into an instrument of constant pressure and blackmail against Ukraine, including about minority rights, the fight against corruption, or the degradation of democracy in Ukraine.

The EU will be able to approve and stop payments. If necessary, the European Council will propose revising the program after two years. But this year in the European Union, elections and the composition of the European Commission and the European Parliament may change significantly, and the next convocation may have a completely different attitude regarding assistance to Ukraine.

 

 

Ruslan Bortnik, Oksana Krasovskaya, Andrey Timchenko

for the Ukrainian Institute of Politics